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Beyond neutrality and/or political
commitment
The ethical commitment of the discourse analyst
Roselyne Koren
1 Most French linguists, discourse analysts and even argumentation scholars maintain that
a researcher can and is obliged to remain neutral and objective even if his object is “hot”,
and by hot I mean polemical andor political, in our case: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As a member of this scientific community – I am a linguist dealing with discourse analysis
and its links to argumentative theories and rhetorical devices – I approve and share this
stand as often as possible and do not wish to judge, moralize or evaluate systematically
every text I have to describe, question and comment on.
2 I will try to demonstrate, however, that there are cases where this decision is disputable
and where neutrality and objectivity are no longer relevant nor justified. My contention
is  that  in  these  cases  refusing  to  cross  the  red  line  separating  neutrality  from
commitment is problematic from a scientific point of view. There is a risk of leading to a
refusal to see and know what is anchored in discourse, taking in vain a fundamental
scholarly function of constructing and transmitting knowledge linked with evaluation
and action.  This stand is  not justified on a priori  political  grounds but on knowledge
established by some theoreticians in the sciences of language. It is, in my view, for an
Israeli scholar the only raison d’être of the right to analyze and criticize the way the state
of  Israel  and  the  conflict  are  portrayed  in  the  French  medias.  Most  of  my  French
colleagues assert that one has to dissociate radically research and militant commitment
which  is  a  question  of  citizenship  and  not  of  research;  my  contention  is  that  this
dissociation prevents us from seeing that there is at least a third option which is not
ideological:  scientific  ethical  commitment  adequate  to  the  axiological  components  of
discourse  and by  axiological,  I  mean conveying explicit  or  implicit  value  judgments,
evaluations of what is good or bad from an individual or collective point of view.
3 We  should  remind  these  theoreticians  of  the  following:  language  is  not  a  harmless
technical  mirror  of  reality,  but  a  formal  symbolic  arbitrary  structure,  an  extremely
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powerful  mode of  social  life;  one of  its  fundamental  and unavoidable  mechanisms is
selection  consequently  linked  with  the  notion  of  subjective  choice;  the  essence  of
language  theorized  by  the  famous  linguist  Emile  Benveniste  (1966)  is  fundamentally
subjective. The verbal act of saying “I, Je” transforms the speaker, in his terms, into a
human social being; this act is automatically linked to the simultaneous emergence of
“tuyou” so that subjectivity and inter-subjectivity are the pillars of discourse defined as a
central mode of social life. When Benveniste deals with subjectivity, he does not mean
emotions but the basis of the human cognitive aptitude and the interdependence of the
notions of individual and society in language. And last, but not least, we know that one of
the  fundamental  functions  of  language  is  to  build  and  transmit  information  and
knowledge, so that the subjective utterer is responsible for the referential truth of his
assertions;  we  also  know,  however,  due  to  the  rhetoric  of  Aristotle  and  to  his
reinterpretation  by  Perelman  in  The New  Rhetoric,  that  discourse  is  also  activated
simultaneously by a logic of values. Due to this logic we justify our choices, opinions and
decisions which lead to persuasion and action, to polemical debate and disagreement or
to  a  heuristic  negotiation  of  our  respective  stands.  Language  is  not  only  a  set  of
techniques dealing with truthful representation, it is also a discursive space where we
deal with values such as good, bad, just and unjust and with conceptions of norms and
argumentative  rules  grounded  in  referential  truth,  but  also  in  ethical  rectitude  or
efficiency which have often nothing to do with truth. So the speaker is accountable not
only for truthful information, but also for his explicit or implicit ethical evaluations and
value judgments which are an essential component of social and political discourses. All
of  us  have to  speak,  whether  we like  it  or  not,  in  linguistic  patterns  coined by  the
circulation of language in society, but the subjective system of discourse also contains an
indelible  component  of  autonomy regulating the speaker’s  liberty  and responsibility.
Does it mean that to be rational, a presentation has to remain in the field of referential
truth and discursive objectivity? My contention as a rhetorician is radically different and
I will try to prove it in my case study. There are, in my view, other regimes of rationality
grounded in critical  evaluation and justification; an ethical decision can and must be
explained  and  justified  as  rigorously  as  a  judgment  of  fact.  The  passive  dominated
audience of an assertion mirroring reality “telle quelle” has to accept it without trying to
discuss it;  the audience of an arguer dealing with the justification of what is right or
wrong, just or unjust, honest or fallacious from his point of view, is the master of the
game.  The speaker’s  argumentation is  not  rational  a priori,  it’s  axiological  rationality
depends on the construction of the argumentation and on the “critical rationalism”1 of
the addressees. Their identification with the speaker’s point of view cannot be imposed
by any kind of  force.  The rationality of  the arguer’s  speech is  then achieved by the
interaction with an autonomous audience and also by an interior dialogue with a third
anonymous  type  of  audience  which  Perelman  calls  the  “universal  audience”2.  This
addressee is called by Bakhtine the “surdestinataire”; he is also grounded in the profound
subjective system of discourse where he plays a crucial ethical role. The speaker has to
try, in front of this inner ethical instance, to aspire to surpass himself. The function of
this aspiration is to prevent him from violating the social values system of his community
but also his own personal beliefs. There is however no guarantee that this speaker will
prefer  to  aspire  to  equity  and  to  renounce  for  example  to  the  benefits  of  the
demonization of the Other, in the name of justice… 
4 So if the dominant Cartesian values system presents neutrality as the ultimate value, and
if however absolute objectivity is linguistically impossible, how can journalists but also
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scholars affirm that one can choose to remain neutral and pretend that language can be
the mirror of referential truths? When an article – or a scientific paper – seems, in spite
of  the  knowledge  that  has  been  evoked  above,  to  appear  neutral  and  objective,  my
contention is  that  these  appearances  are  grounded in  well-known rhetorical  devices
which create artificial effects of objectivity. There are a lot of such devices: erasure of the
verbal traces of the speaker’s presence, impersonal syntactic forms, citations, attribution
to facts of human behaviors,  numerical indications, counting of victims and statistics
transformed in salient events. One can observe, for example, in the following statements
the attribution of human behaviors to facts: the irony of history has transformed the former
terrorist into the institutional head of the State, The situation requires serious economic
changes,  etc.  Erasing the  verbal  presence of  the  speaker  can also  transform a  value
judgment,  an  opinion  into  a  pseudo-neutral  judgment  of  fact.  The  utterer  then  can
pretend that he is  not responsible for his  report;  he presents himself  as  the neutral
mirror or the “loud-speaker” of indisputable self-evidences.
 
Beyond neutrality or political commitment: the ethical
commitment
5 So my proposition of a different conception of the ethics and commitment of the scholar
is grounded in the above epistemological stands. I do not pretend that my proposition is
unique and original. The English school of discourse analysis, the American theories of
informal  logic  and  the  argumentation  theory  of  the  pragma-dialectic  center  of  Van
Eemeren in Amsterdam do not hesitate to be normative; the refusal of normativity is
specific of most of the scholars in the sciences of language in France. The English school
of  discourse  analysis3 asserts  for  example  explicitly  that  its  theory is  grounded in a
Marxist  ideology of  social  life,  but  that  it  does  not  impair  the  scientific  aspect  of  a
conception of research deeply anchored in close reading and linguistic knowledge. I do
not wish however to enter any prior ideological conviction in my scientific frame; my
conception of  the discourse analyst’s  commitment is  not  political  but  ethical  and by
ethical  I  mean  in  this  paper:  questioning  the  verbal  rectitude  and  the  discursive
responsibility of scholars and journalists dealing with the image of the State of Israel and
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is at stake here is the accountability not only to
referential truth but also and often simultaneously to value judgments about what is good
or just, bad or unjust and to the consequences of verbal stands in a context of questions of
life and death. 
6 Discourse analysts and the linguists generally agree that there are no verbal specific signs
of truths and lies; I do not intend to criticize this established fact. Most of these scholars
also deny the possibility and the scientific right of designating and describing verbal
traces of deliberate manipulation or argumentative fallacy. When they admit that there
are  polemical  devices  of  destruction  of  one’s  public  face  or  image,  they  restrict
themselves to the description of these devices and refuse to utter any value judgment on
the eventual consequences of these types of demonization even if it may constitute an
implicit legitimization of lethal intentions. The discursive responsibility of the utterer’s
value judgments is not a scientific objective in their view. My contention is however that
reasoning  in  a  deliberately  deceptive  way  implies  visible  linguistic  traces  of
argumentative and discursive dysfunctions. These dysfunctions have to be deconstructed
and evaluated if one wishes to lead to an emancipator function of knowledge. I will try to
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show that fallacies, deliberate verbal manipulation, and bad faith are not optical illusions
depending on the addressee’s benevolent or malevolent perception in particular socio-
historical contexts. One can designate the procedures and the verbal places of discursive
and argumentative dysfunctions: informal natural logic is normed less rigorously than
formal  logic,  but  ethical  norms  of  rectitude,  and  the  rules  derived  from  them,  are
anchored in the deep structure of discourse and are well known and defined by scholars4.
So, in my view, it is scientifically relevant to ask such questions as: ”Is this reasoning
valid ?“, ”What are the limits beyond which the argument is not admissible ?“, and to try
to answer in a rational scientific way, even if you know and accept a priori that your
conclusions are refutable and will surely be discussed. The alternative for the scholar who
prefers not to enter these pitfalls  where it  is  so difficult  to trace clear and absolute
frontiers between bad faith and discursive rectitude is meta-linguistical scholarly silence;
refusal of being simultaneously spectator and actor and consequently, in my view, refusal
of dealing with a lethal component of language and with its consequences in cases of life
and  death,  refusal  of  knowing,  analyzing  and  evaluating  the  part  of  the  speaker’s
responsibility  which  does  not  deal  with  referential  truth  but  with  value  judgments.
Scholarly silence about this component of language is not imposed, in my eyes, by ethical
incontestable professional rules, but by a rationalist fear of judging and taking a stand.
My contention is that in the field of ethical vital questions the discourse analyst has to
turn to “critical rationalism”, and by critical I mean evaluative axiological rationalism
grounded  in  scientific  knowledge  and  activation  of  the  ethical  responsibility  of  any
speaker. 
 
From theory to practice…
7 Let us move now from these theoretical considerations to a concrete case study: the role
played  in  the  presentation  of  the  conflict  by  a  rhetorical  device  called  in  French
l’amalgame5, a term which can be translated to English as fallacious analogy, translation
containing  a  scientific  normative  stand:  ”fallacious“  refers  indeed  to  a  manipulative
dysfunction in the well-known frame of analogy. Analogy plays a central role among the
verbal arguments establishing the structure of extralinguistic realities; it is considered by
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) in the The New Rhetoric A Treatise on Argumentation
as a crucial heuristic argument, stimulating reflection and thoughtful debate. The basic
analogical pattern is “A” is to “B” what “C” is to “D”, which underlines a partial similarity
between the type of link binding “B” to “A” and “D” to “C”; “AB” being the unknown
phoros, and “CD” the known theme helping the audience to define and conceptualize the
unknown.  “AB” and “CD” are  heterogeneous,  but  this  fact  is  not  an obstacle  to  the
construction of knowledge: what is at stake is only a partial similarity. There are several
types of analogies : for example ”A“ is to “B” what “A” is to “C” where “A” can be , for
example, the notion of totalitarianism (namely totalitarianism is to the German political
power in 1940-45 similar to totalitarianism activated by the communist executive power,
totalitarianism  being  so  transformed  into  a  general  common  qualification).  Analogy
becomes fallacious  when the speaker  authorizes  himself  to  deduce,  from this  partial
similarity, that one can glide from it towards total assimilation. If ”A” is to “B” what “C”
is to “D”, then “AB” and “CD” are no longer heterogeneous, but totally equal: “CRS = SS”,
“IDF (Tsahal) = Wehrmacht” and “Gaza = the Warsaw Ghetto”. One can then consider that
if they are equal,  one has to apply in their  case the “rule of  justice”6;  an argument
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stipulating that identical entities have to be treated in the same way in the name of an
egalitarian  rationalism  refusing  to  judge  and  evaluate  lest  they  become  unjust  and
partial. The role of the well known theme “CD” is often played in the “amalgame” by one
of the actual paragon of the evil: Nazism, Hitler, the SS, racism, fascism, apartheid, etc.
Gliding  from  analogy  to  historical  metaphors  implies  a  procedure  of  discursive
condensation which gives to the metaphoric qualifications the appearances of disturbing
pseudo self-evidences. In the case of the “amalgame”, the historical heuristic metaphor
turns into an axiological incriminating qualification which justifies implicitly the target’s
destruction. Fallacious metaphors such as “CRS = SS” ground their power in efficiency
and not in referential truth or ethical rectitude. The verbal force of the amalgame should
not to be confused however with the brilliance of truth or self-evidence; the fallacious
assimilation becomes irrelevant  from the moment  one opposes  it  historical  essential
differences, which have been obscured to mask ideological or lethal stands such as: if “X”
equals “evil incarnate” then it is legitimate to ask for the physical destruction or for the
public  de-legitimization of  the target’s  right  to exist.  The assimilation of  the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to WW II and the procedures of nazification and demonization of the
state of Israel are at stake here. I am quite aware that there are also some Israeli people
using “amalgames” for de-legitimizing Palestinian politicians or even their own political
adversaries. I’m also aware that the fallacious analogy is not specific to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, and that this conflict has not invented it. It has become today a rhetorical
international  device  which  tries  to  justify  and  legitimize  implicitly  punitive  violent
sanctions or hatred in a period of human history where killing or hating are condemned
by the western systems of values.
8 So if  using fallacious  analogies  is  not  specific  of  the  image of  the  Palestinian-Israeli
conflict we are dealing with, if “CRS = SS”, “Nazism = Communism”, “Milosevic = Hitler”,
“Islamism  = Nazism”  are  also  well  known  and  frequent  lethal  formulas,  is  there  no
difference at all between the use of this device in the Middle East and in the case of other
international actual targets ? Let us analyze some examples and try through them to
answer this question.
9 1. Libération (20.09.1982) publishes after the massacre of Sabra and Chatila the following
statement in an editorial by Gérard Dupuy: “In a period following the great Nazi genocide
you witness a major perversion of Jewish ethics. […] The Israelis say: ‘we did not want’,
‘we did not know’. But do you think that the German populace […] acknowledged joyfully
the existence of Dachau and Auschwitz?”7. The rhetoric of this editorial is of course much
more subtle than the equation “Nazi Germany = Israel”; it leads implicitly to the following
points by simply juxtaposing the evocation of  the theme,  the massacre of  Sabra and
Shatila  next  to  the  phoros  “Nazi  genocide”;  this  syntactic  structure  creates  through
juxtaposition a new type of discursive synonyms. The assimilation of the Israeli people to
the “German populace” follows a similar procedure: people who say the same thing when
discovering the existence of massacres are identical; this identification justifies another
one, the assimilation of the camp of Palestinian refugees to Dachau and Auschwitz. We
can observe here a rhetorical  device called by Libération (21.09.1982)  the “Copernican
revolution”,  namely a  phenomenon of  inversion of  the roles  of  victim and hangman
which implies implicitly that the real murderers of the Palestinian refugees are the Israeli
soldiers.  This  inversion  is  an  additional  device  constituting  a  specific  trait  of  the
fallacious analogy in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A second trait is the excessiveness of
a repeated fallacious equation of Israel to the absolute evil.
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10 2. Additional illustration: an extract of an editorial of Jean Daniel also published in 1982.
It could constitute a link with the actual rhetoric using the phoros “ghetto” to refer to
Gaza. Daniel’s article “Pour l’honneur d’Israël” begins by a pseudo-lexicographic definition
of the notion of ghetto: “the place where a population finds refuge, the place where they
are parked, enclosed, locked up, what do you call it? A ghetto. You may invoke whatever
you  wish,  that  the  rapprochements  are  painful,  the  fact  remains  nevertheless
unavoidable.”8 This definition constitutes the ground of a total assimilation of the ghetto
with the camps of Sabra and Shatila. The editorialist infers then from the total identity of
these two places that the Palestinian victims have become “the Jews of their butchers” (“
les  Juifs  de  leurs  massacreurs”).  Israel  has  lost,  asserts  Jean Daniel  “the caution of  the
martyr  which  has  sanctified  its  origins”.  What  is  here  singular  to  the  rhetoric
constructing the public image of Israel is the “Copernican revolution” which reverses the
roles  victimhangman,  the  implicit  questioning  of  Israel’s  right  to  exist  and  the
exorbitance  of  the  peremptory  tone  of  “the  fact  is  nevertheless  unavoidable”  which
presents an opinion and a fallacious analogy as a truthful indisputable judgment of fact.
What  is  common however  to  the  journalistic  rhetoric  of  the  presentation of  several
contemporary  conflicts  is  the  Manichaean  oscillation  between  demonization  and
victimization making it impossible to think of the complexity of the conflicts in political,
socio-historical terms. This rhetoric does not question the lethal consequences of these
assimilations and places the appeal to emotions, such as compassion versus hatred, above
the contribution to the explanation of the complex ins and outs of the enemies positions.
 
Conclusion
11 My decision to argue in favor of a scientific ethical commitment is essentially linked here
with the decision to unmask fallacious assimilations, which constitute more or less an
implicit justification of hatred and destruction. This decision implies the activation of a
scientific knowledge which permits justifying every step of a conception of discourse
analysis  integrating  an  argumentative  logic  of  values.  Does  this  choice  impair
scientificity? Does it dispossess the audience of its freedom of thought? My contention is
that it does not impair it nor dispossesses anyone of his freedom of thought as long as the
following  conditions  are  fulfilled:  explicit  distinction between the  levels  of  scientific
description  and  explanation  on  one  side  and  ethical  evaluation  on  the  other  side,
justification  of  the  scholar’s  point  of  view  anchored  in  scholarly  knowledge,
accountability for judgments of fact but also for value judgments, acceptance of the fact
that  a  speech act  cannot  mediate  absolute  truths  but  only subjective disputable  and
refutable opinions. However, everyone, scholar and citizen included, has, in my view, the
right  and  sometimes  the  obligation  to  judge  and  protest  against  bad  faith  and
argumentative fallacies when it is an ethical question of life and death.
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NOTES
1. See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971), p. 514: “The theory and practice of argumentation
are, in our view, correlative with a critical rationalism that transcends the duality ‘judgments of
reality’-‘value judgments’”.
2. See, regarding this notion, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971), p. 31-35. 
3. See, regarding this theoretical frame (Critical Discourse Analysis): I. & N. Fairclough 2012, R.
Wodak or T. A. Van Dijk 2009.
4. One  can  also  easily  observe  verbal  marks  of  argumentative  dysfunctions  in  the  frame  of
humor, irony, jokes and puns. See for example Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971),  p. 204,
“Presenting  theses  as  compatible  or  incompatible”:  “an  amusing  case  of  the  application  of
retort”. 
5. See, regarding this device, Koren 1995, 1996 and 2012.
6. See, regarding this argument, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971), pp. 218-220.
7. My translation of: “On assiste, au sortir du grand génocide nazi, à une perversion majeure de
l’éthique juive. [...] Les Israéliens diront “On ne voulait pas, on ne savait pas.” Mais croit-on que
le populo allemand [...] a reconnu de gaieté de cœur l’existence de Dachau ou d’Auschwitz?” in
“Le sang chaud de sang-froid”, Éditorial, G. Dupuy, Libération, 20.09.1982.
8. My translation of: “Le lieu où une population se réfugie, le lieu où on la parque, l’enferme, la
boucle, cela s’appelle comment ? Un ghetto. [..] On pourra invoquer ce qu’on voudra, dire […] que
les  rapprochements  sont  douloureux,  le  fait  n’en demeure pas  moins […]  incontournable”.  J.
Daniel, Éditorial, Le nouvel Observateur, 25.09.1982.
ABSTRACTS
The aim of this contribution is to revisit the question of the duty of objectivity of the researcher,
analyst of media discourses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is not to contest the validity of a
“neutral” posture, but rather to reexamine it and to amend it in particular cases where matters
of  life  and death are  analyzed.  The author  shows that  this  amendment  is  necessary  not  for
political but for ethical reasons: even if words do not kill, they can however legitimate a vilifying
image of one side, while rendering acceptable deadly violence of the other and incitement to
hatred.The author will try to justify the following hypothesis: objectivity or, on the contrary,
political commitment, are not the only options in matter of scientific position. There exists a
third option, namely an explicit ethical commitment of the researcher, supported by scientific
knowledge.
Cette  contribution  souhaite  problématiser  la  question  du  devoir  d’objectivité  du  chercheur,
analyste de discours médiatiques sur le conflit israélo-palestinien. Il ne s’agit pas de contester la
validité de la posture “neutre”, mais de la revisiter et de l’amender dans les cas où les corpus
analysés ont des questions de vie et de mort pour objet. On soutiendra que cet amendement est
rendu nécessaire pour des raisons éthiques et non pas politiques : les mots certes ne tuent pas,
mais il peuvent contribuer à la légitimation de la diabolisation et de la violence mortifère ou de
l’incitation  à  la  haine.  L’auteur  tentera  de  justifier  l’hypothèse  suivante :  l’objectivité  ou  au
Beyond neutrality and/or political commitment
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
8
contraire l’engagement politique ne sont pas les seules options en matière de positionnement
scientifique ;  il  en existe une troisième : l’engagement éthique explicite, justifié par un savoir
scientifique.
INDEX




Roselyne Koren is Full Professor of Language Sciences at the French Department of Bar-Ilan
University and coordinator, with Professor Ruth Amossy, of the research group ADARR
(Discourse analysis Argumentation Rhetoric). She is the author of Les Enjeux éthiques de l’écriture
de presse et la mise en mots du terrorisme [Ethical stakes in press writing and putting terrorism into
words] (Paris, L’Harmattan). She is also the author of numerous articles and chapters on the
following questions: the regulation of appearances of discursive objectivity and subjectivity in
the French written press, denomination and implicit argumentation; the ins and outs of
argumentation by analogy; publications about totalitarian discourses, demonization in polemical
discourses, axiological evaluation in discourse, scientific research and commitment, enunciative
responsibility, ethics of discourse.
Beyond neutrality and/or political commitment
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
9
